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In 1965, the median before-tax family income was
$7,610, the new home mortgage rate averaged 5.81
percent, and the median sale price of a new one-
family house was $20,150. With a 20 percent down
payment and a 30-year mortgage to secure the bal-
ance, a homeowner would owe $1,136 in annual in-
terest and principal payment on the debt, approxi-
mately 14.9 percent of his income.
In 1980, by comparison, median before-tax income
was approximately $21,500, the new home mortgage
rate for the year averaged 13,73 percent, and the
median sale price of a new one-family house vaulted
to $64,900. The annual interest and principal charges
on a 30-year mortgage for this home, again assuming
a 20 percent down payment, would be $7,249, or 33.7
percent of the median income (see table 1).
As evidenced by these numbers, the change in the
cost of homeownership has been drastic. This article
explains why this cost has risen so sharply: why the
1965 median-income family had to pay less than
15 percent of its annual income in mortgage pay-
ments on a median-priced house, while the 1980
median-income family must pay more than 33 per-
t
The median of a set of data is the number below and above
which there are an equal number of observations.
cent. Two separate issues are considered: the increase
in housing prices and the increase in the cost of
financing a home purchase.
THE RISE IN HOUSING PRICES
From 1965 to 1980, the prices of personal consump-
tion goods more than doubled, rising 131.8 percent.
Since inflation is a sustained increase in the general
level of prices, one would expect similar increases in
housing prices. However, the prices of new housing
for the same period rose an even higher 223,2 per-
cent.2 Table 2 shows the annual rate of increase in
new housing prices and personal consumption goods.
‘This indicates that individuals who owned homes over this
period have experienced sizable capital gains. On this matter,
see Patric H. Hendershott and Sheng Cheng flu, “Inflation
and the Benefits from Owner-Occupied Flousing” (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 383, Au-
gust 1979) for a discussion of the capital gains experienced
by households. The present paper does not analyze the ramifi-
cations of these capital gains on the demand for housing.
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Why the Median-Priced Home
Costs So Much
NFLATION has caused many distortions that af-
fect the affordability of housing, especially for first-
time buyers. Since 1965, the price of the median-
priced house in the United States has more than
tripled.1 More important, however, the annual mort-
gage payment for a standard financing arrangement
is almost seven times as large as before for the
median-priced house. As a result, the median-income
family is unlikely to qualify for and presumably would
be reluctant to obtain conventional financing to buy
the median-priced house today.
Table 1
Comparison of Income and Mortgage
Payments for 1965 and 1980
(current dollars)
1965 1980
Median before-tax ncome S 7.610 821.500
Median sale price of a new home 820.150 564.900
Average mortgage rate 5.81% 13.73%
Annua~inierest and principal S 1.136 $ 7,229
Payment as a percentage of income 14.9% 33.7%
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Table 2
Annual Change in Housing Prices and





















1D’mta on hon ng pn e are for e sal only
Only in 1970, 1974 and 1980 was the annual rate of
increase in housing prices less than that of personal
consumption goods. Thus, while general inflation ex-
plains most of the increase in housing prices, it leaves
unanswered the question \vhy housing prices have
risen faster than the general price level.
Quality Changes
One possible explanation for this phenomenon is
that the quality of housing has risen over the past 15
years; thus, we are comparing the p1-ice of two dis-
similar goods. Though this problem plagues all price
index measures, it appears to be particularly impor-
tant in the case of housing. The average new home is
larger and has more amenities, such as central air
conditioning and insulation, Still, economists generally
believe that these quality increases are not substantial
enough to fully explain the rapid relative price rise.tm
3
For exan pIe, Randall J. Pordena, “Inflation Expectations and
the Housing Market,” Federal Reserve Bank of Sarm Francisco
Economic Review (Fall 1980), pp. 29-47, estimates that 15
percent of the increase in the average home sales price be-
tween 1970 and 1979 is explained by quality considerations.
Demographic and Lifestyle Factors
Additional factors that help explain the relative
increase in housing prices are demographic changes
since 1965. First, the adult population—the pur-
chasers of homes — has grown rapidly in recent
years.4 There appear to be two sources of this growth.
One, individuals born in the post-World War II baby
boom have moved into the homebnying age group.
Two, the U.S. population now enjoys an increased
longevity.
In addition, lifestyle changes apparently have in-
creased the demand for shelter, at least partially af-
fecting the demand for owner-occupied housing. For
example, the proportion of unmarried adults has in-
creased with the rise in the divorce rate and the post-
ponement of marriage. These lifestyle changes have
resulted in more and more single-person households,
Today there often are two people demanding hous-
ing, where before there was one.
Inflation and the Favorable Tax
Treatment of Homeownership
A third factor causing the relative rise of housing
prices is the favorable treatment of homeo\vnership
by the U.S. tax structure. As inflation has accelerated,
this treatment has become even more favorable, a For
example, an individual can deduct mortgage interest
expenses from taxable income in determining his in-
come tax. Thus, as nominal interest rates and mort-
gage rates rise with inflation, borrowers can deduct
larger interest expenses, even if the real (inflation
adjusted) cost of borrowing remains uuchanged. In
other words, the higher the anticipated future infla-
tion, the cheaper it is to borrow under our tax
system!1 Since most people borrow to purchase a
4
For a more detailed discussion, see Dan M. Bechter, “How
Much F’or a New House in the Years AhcadP Sonic Insights
From 1975-80” (Federal Reserve l3ank of Kansas City, Re-
search \vorking Paper 81-104).
iAnthoriy Downs, ‘‘The Low (Real) Cost of Housing,” Across
time Board (February 1981), pp. 51-55; James M. Poterba,
‘Inflation, Income Taxes and Osvaer—Occupied Housing” (Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No, 553,
September 1980).
°There isan important rlistinction between nominal and real
interest rates. Nominal interest rates ale market interest rates
which state how many dollars the borrower will pay and the
lender will receive on a loan, Since inflation depreciates the
value of a dollar in terms of its comnniand over resources,
nominal rates are hid up by anticipated inflation. Real interest
rates are rates that have been adjusted for inflation. The
expected real interest rate can he measured by subtractmng
the expected annual rate of inflation from the nominal interest
rate.
The favorable treatment given to borrowers comes fromn the
fact that individuals can deduct nomninal interest expenses
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house, this increasingly favorable treatment has in-
creased the demand for the single-family dwelling.
This benefit becomes even more important as infla-
tion pushes individuals into higher marginal income
tax brackets (bracket creep). Bracket creep has in-
creased the marginal tax rate for the median-income
family from 17 percent in 1965 to 24 percent in 1980.
As individuals are pushed into higher marginal tax
brackets, the value of deducting interest expenses in-
creases. Thus, even if the interest expense on a loan
or mortgage were unaffected by inflation, individuals
would pay less after-tax dollars to borrow in 1980
than they did in 1965. Since we have a progressive
income tax structure, the increase in marginal tax
rates has been even larger for family incomes greater
than the median. In 1965, a family whose income was
in the 80th percentile (who earned more dollars than
80 percent of all other families) was in the 19 percent
marginal tax bracket. In comparison, by 1980 this
family was in the 37 percent marginal tax bracket.
Thus, high-income families have experienced even
greater reductions in the after-tax cost of borrowing
as inflation has moved them into higher marginal
tax brackets!
In another benefit of our tax structure, capital gains
realized from the sale of a home are not taxed if
they are reinvested in another homne. In addition,
people over the age of 55 can now realize a tax-free,
one-time capital gain of $100,000 or less from the sale
of their home. Consequently, some homeowners effec-
tively pay no tax on capital gains from home owner-
ship, substantially less than they’ would pay in taxes
on capital gains from stocks or bonds.
An additional favorable tax consideration concerns
housing as a form of investment. Consider an investor
from their incomes in determining taxable income. Compare
two individuals — one in an inflationary environment with 10
percent inflation and the other in arm environment with no in—
Ilation. Suppose tIme i imterest rates are 13 percent and 3 per-
cent, respectively, so tlmat the real rate is 3 percent in both
cases. Although time real cost of borrowing is the same for
each inrhividuai, the after—tax real cost is lower for the person
imm the inflationary environment since that individual’s nominal
interest expense is much larger.
The point that the present tax structure favors borrowing
has also been made in Lawrence H. Summers,”Inflation, the
Stock Market and Owner Occupied Housing” (National Bu-
reau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 606, Decem-
her 1980).
7
See Patric 11. Ilendershott, “Estimates of Investment Functions
and Some Implications for Productivity Cro\vth,’ ill Laurence
I-I. Meyer, ed., The Supply-Side Effects of Economic Policy
(St. Louis Center for the Study of American Business and
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), pp. 149-65.
who is contemplating tsvo alternative purchases: a
purchase either of $70,000 in securities or. a $70,000
house. In the first case, the investor earns taxable
interest income from the investment. In the latter, he
receives no direct monetary remuneration, but he
does obtain certain housing services referred to as “im-
puted rent”—the value of these services if the investor
were renting the house.8If the expected annual interest
income equals the imputed rent (and if neither in-
vestment is appreciating in value), tax considerations
would induce the investor to purchase the house
rather than the securities, because the income earned
from the house is untaxed.
Furthermore, inflation drives nominal interest rates
up so that the interest income from securities increases
(relative to interest income in noninflationary situa-
tions). This raises the tax burden on securities, mak-
ing the investor worse off. Thus, a rise in the inflation
rate increases the relative attractiveness of imputed
income versus income from securities.
Finally, the U.S. tax structure is such that, during
periods of high inflation, corporations are penalized
with higher tax bills, while no such effect occurs on
housing investments. Thus, individuals become wary
of investing in corporate stocks. Corporations are
affected because the depreciation of their assets is
based on historic cost, and their inventories are valued
by first-in - first-out (FIFO) inventory accounting.
With respect to depreciation, present tax accounting
practices do not write off capital expenses rapidly
enough. In an inflationary environment, the dollar
value of depreciation for a machine should represent
both the physical deterioration of the machine, and the
fact that it will take more dollars in the future to re-
place the machine or any of its parts. Present depre-
ciation practices fail to recognize this latter element of
depreciation and, as such, overstate corporate profits.
With corporations paying more in taxes, the return to
equity holders is reduced accordingly. A similar over-
statement of profits results when corporations use
FIFO inventory accounting. A number of studies have
suggested that these factors have induced investors
to divert money from the stock market into the hous-
ing market, where as noted above, more favorable tax
treatment is available.9
8
See Anthony NI. Rufolo, “What’s Ahead for Housing Prices?”
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Reeiew (July/
August 1980), pp. 9-15.
“Patnie H. Hendershott, “The Decline in Aggregate Share
\Taltes: Inflation and Taxation of the Returns From Equities
and Owner—Occupied Ilousing” (National Bureau of Eeoumaie
Research, Working Paper No. 3
7
0,July 1979) and 5mm mmers,
“Inflation, the Stock Market amid Owner Occupied I-lousing.”
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Many factors have increased the demand for resi-
dential housing over the last 15 years)°It is important
to recognize that part of this stimulus to demand
comes from the favorable tax treatment of housing
which has worked to increase the after-tax afford-
ability of housing from an economic perspective; that
is, the relative after-tax price of housing is being re-
duced by the interaction of inflation and the present
tax structure.1’ Looking at the ratio of mortgage pay-
ments to before-tax income, as many homebuyers and
lending institutions do, fails to recognize this point.
THE COST OF BORROWING
As we have seen, housing prices have risen faster
than other prices over the last 15 years. However,
family incomes have also risen faster than inflation
over this same period. In fact, family incomes nearly
have kept up with housing prices. In 1965, the ratio
of the median-priced house to the median family
income was 2.6; in 1980 the ratio had risen only to
3.0. Thus, ignoring tax considerations, the 1980 house
would not appear to be substantially more expensive
relative to income than it was in 1965.
To make this point another way, consider what
‘would result if the 1980 median-income family could
purchase the 1980 median-priced house, at the 1965
mortgage rate. If this family bought a 1980 median-
priced home, but borrowed 80 percent of the purchase
price at a mortgage rate equal to the 1965 average
of 5.81 percent, its principal and interest payments
would have been only 17.0 percent of the median
family income. Thus, the 1980 median-income family
could well afford the 1980 median-priced house, if
only they could obtain a 5.81 percent mortgage rate.
This hypothetical case is clearly unrealistic, but it
does suggest that a major culprit in the 1980 afforda-
bility problem is today’s high level of mom-tgage rates.
At a mortgage rate of 13.73 percent, today’s home-
buyer would be paying more than 33 percent of his
current income in terms of interest and principal
alone.
10
1n addition, other factors have retarded the supply of hous-
ing. Bechter, “How N-Inch For a New FlouseP’ p. 13, sees
govemnmeat regulations “as being directly or indirectly re-
sponsible for holding back the rate of increase itm the pace of
homebuilding during the rising portion of the last housing
cycle,” In this light government policies have also increased
the relative price of housing by imposing stringent zoning
codes and subdivision regulations.
~~This point has led Downs, “The Low (Real) Cost of [lous-
ing, to suggest that the United States is overinvesting in
housing. Also, see Hendershott, ‘Estimates of Investment
Functions.”
But today’s high level of mortgage rates, in and of
itself, is not the problem. Though the mortgage rate
was quite high in 1980, it is unlikely that this rate
has substantially reduced the long-run economic in-
centive to own a home. Quoted mortgage rates are
nominal rates. Nominal rates alone, however, have
little influence on an individual’s purchasing or invest-
ment decisions. Both tax considerations and antici-
pated future inflation influence these decisions.
When the anticipated inflation rate and the favor-
able tax treatment given to housing are taken into
account, homebuying is not nearly as adversely af-
fected by high nominal mortgage rates as might first
be thought. As we have seen, the ability to write off
interest expenses reduces the true interest costs asso-
ciated with purchasing a home. Last year, for example,
a median-income family of four was in the 24 per-
cent marginal tax bracket for U.S. income tax pur-
poses. After deducting interest expenses from the pur-
chase of a new home, the family’s after-tax mortgage
rate was reduced (at the margin) from the market
rate of 13.73 percent to the net rate of 10.43 percent
[13.73 x (1 -0.24)]. The 1965 median-income family,
on the other hand, paid a 4.71 percent [5.81 >< (1 -
0.19)] marginal after-tax mortgage rate.
Further, when inflation expectations are considered,
this after-tax rate of 10.43 percent in 1980 may not be
all that high. ?~ominalinterest rates are high today,
when compared to those in 1965, because investors
anticipate a higher future inflation rate than they
anticipated in 1965. As such, they recognize that
the dollars which will be paid back in the future will
bny fewer goods, and they demand compensation
accordingly. Borrowers, also anticipating inflation, rec-
ognize they will be paying back the loan with a
depreciated currency and thus do not find high nomi-
nal interest rates prohibitive.
For example, take the 1965 median-income family
who must pay 4.71 percent after taxes to borrow at
the 1965 mortgage rate. Suppose this family antici-
pates that future inflation will be 2 percent per year.
If this family borrosvs $100 for a year, they would
pay back, after tax deductibility is allowed, $104.71
at the end of one year. Since they expect 2 percent
inflation, however, they see the foregone $104.71 as
equivalent to giving up $102.66 ($104.71/1.02) in
present dollars. Thus, the real after-tax interest rate
is only 2.66 percent — this 1965 homebuyer expects
to give up only $2.66 worth of goods and services to
borrow $100.
How much inflationmust today’s homebuyer antici-
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pate to make them indifferent between the present
arrangement and that of 1965? The after-tax mortgage
rate for the 1980 median-income family is 10.43 per-
cent. Thus, after tax deductions, the family will pay
$110.43 to borrow $100 for one year at the 1980 mort-
gage rate. If the family anticipates inflation at 8 per-
cent over the next year, they see the $110.43 given up
at the end of one year as equivalent to $102.25
($110.43/lOS) in 1980 dollars. The real after-tax rate
is 2.25 percent. Thus, the 1980 median-income family
expecting the future inflation rate to be 8 percent or
more anticipates lower after-tax real borrowing costs
than the 1965 median-income family that expected a
future inflation rate of 2 percent.
If individuals expect inflation to continue at recent
levels, the 10.43 percent after-tax rate the median-
income family must pay for a 13.73 percent mortgage
represents a relatively small cost in terms of the real
goods and services that must be given up. It is un-
likely then that the recent high nominal mortgage
rates alone have significantly discouraged home pur-
chases. Thus, when both taxes and anticipated future
inflation are taken into account, the after-tax real cost
of the mortgage is apparently not unduly prohibitive.
THE CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE
If, as has been argued, neither 1980 housing prices
nor 1980 mortgage rates are too great a burden for
prospective homeowners, what has caused the signifi-
cant increase in the ratio of mortgage payments to
income? The answer lies in restrictions resulting from
conventional mortgage agreements.
Conventionally, mortgage debt is amortized over
the repayment period, usually 25 to 30 years, so that
the periodic payment is fixed, and both the principal
and interest are paid off by the end of the loan. One
of the main features of the conventional mortgage is
that it fixes the pem-iodic payments in dollar terms for
the duration of the loan. This feature was useful in
a noninflationary environment, but is it when future
inflation is expected?
Consider two hypothetical cases in which a family
with the median income in 1980 borrows $51,920 to
purchase the median-priced house.12 In the first case,
suppose the family (and the rest of the public) antici-
pates no inflationin the future, expecting the prices of
goods and services to remain essentially unchanged.
The family realistically expects its income to rise, hut
this expectation is based on anticipated productivity
gains, not inflation. As such, the increase in expected
‘
2
Wc will ignore all tax considerations in the following analysis.
future income implies an increased future command
over goods and services. Assume the family expects
their income to rise at an annual rate of 3 percent.
Similarly, assume the family can borrow at a3per-
cent rate.
In the second case, suppose the family (and the
rest of the public) anticipates a steady 8 percent rate
of inflation for 30 years. We assume that in every other
way this family is similar to the first. Specifically, we
assume that the family expects its income to grow in
real (inflation-adjusted) terms at a 3 percent rate. This
implies that the family expects their dollar income to
increase at about an 11 percent rate — 8 percent due
to inflation. 3 percent due to real prodnctivity gains.
Table 3 lists the two respective dollar income streams
that are anticipated in these two situations. While the
expected income streams are quite different, each fam-
ily expects its command over goods and services to be
the same under each scenario, In addition, we will as-
sume in this second case that the family expecting 8
percent inflation can borrow at an 11 percent rate, so
that in real terms the cost of borrowing is 3 percent
as it was in case one.
Thus, we are comparing a family in two different
situations that are essentially identical when infla-
tion is accounted for. Each family starts with the
same dollar income and buys the same dollar-priced
house. With the passing of every year, each family
can buy 3 percent more goods and services than it
could the previous year. In addition, the real cost of
borrowing is the same in each case: to borrow a dol-
lar today, each family promises to pay back enough
money in one year to buy what $1.03 buys today.
The two families should be equally happy. In real
terms their situations are identical. But let us con-
sider what would happen if each family were to obtain
a conventional mortgage. In the first case, with the
family expecting zero inflation and borrowing at a 3
percent rate, -the annual mortgage payment turns out
to be $2,627. In the second case, the family expecting
8 percent inflation and hon-owing at an 11 percent
rate faces a $5,933 annual mortgage payment. Over
the full term of the mortgage, the two situations are
identical, The significantly higher nominal payment
in the second case is due to expected inflation. If, as
we assume, inflation turns out to equal the 8 percent
rate expected, the interest paid on the second debt
over the full 30-year period will buy exactly the same
amount of goods and scm-vices as in the no inflation
case. Thus, in such a case the family is simply com-
pensating the lender for the eroding value of money
and is no worse off in a real sense.
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Table 3
Percent of Principal and Interest to Income With and Without Inflation
No Inflation 8% Inflation
Payment as Payment Payment as
a percent adjusted a percent
Median ofmedian for Median of median
Year Payment income income Payment inflation income income
1980 S2.627 $21,500 12.2% $5,933 $5,933 $ 21.500 27.6%
1981 2.627 22,145 11.9 5.933 5,494 23.917 24.8
1982 2.627 22.809 11.5 5933 5,087 26.604 22.3
1983 2,627 23.494 11.2 5.933 4.710 29.596 20.0
1984 2.627 24,198 10.9 5.933 4,381 32.921 16.0
1985 2.627 24,924 10.5 5933 4.038 36622 16.2
1966 2,627 25.672 10.2 5,933 3,739 40.738 14.6
1987 2,627 26,442 9.9 5933 3462 45.317 13.1
1968 2.627 27.235 9.6 5,933 .3,205 50410 11.8
1989 2,627 28,052 9.4 5.933 2.968 56.076 10.6
1990 2,627 28.894 9.1 5933 2,748 62.380 9.5
1991 2.627 29.761 8.8 5.933 2,525 69392 8.5
1992 2,627 30,654 8.6 5.933 2.356 77192 7.7
1993 2,627 31,573 8.3 5.933 2,182 85.867 6.9
1994 2,267 32.520 8.1 5,933 2020 95.518 6.2
1995 2,627 33,496 7.8 5.933 1,870 106,255 5.6
1996 2,627 34,501 7.6 5.933 1.732 118.198 5.0
1997 2.627 35.536 7.4 5,933 1,604 131.484 4.5
1996 2,627 36,602 7.1 5.933 1.485 142.267 4.1
1999 2.627 37.700 7.0 5,933 1,375 162 702 37
2000 2.627 38,831 6.8 5.933 1.273 180 090 3.3
2001 2,627 39,996 6.6 5.933 1.179 201 333 3.0
2002 2,627 41.196 6.4 5.933 1 091 223 969 2.7
2003 2,627 42.431 6.2 5,933 1.010 2-19,132 2.4
2004 2,627 43.704 6.0 5.933 936 277.135 2.1
2005 2,627 45,015 5.8 5.933 866 308.289 1.9
2006 2,627 46,366 5.7 5,933 802 3’12 939 1.7
2007 2,627 47,757 5.5 5.933 743 381.466 1.6
2008 2.627 49 199 5.3 5.933 688 42’l 359 1.4
2009 2.627 50665 5.2 5.933 637 472.060 1.3
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Since, under the conventional mortgage, the periodic
payment is fixed in nominal tenns, the borrower mnst
compensate the lender early in the repayment period
for inflation expected to occur many years down the
road. However, the ratio of mortgage payment to
family income falls quite rapidly as the second fam-
ily’s income increases because of productivity gains
and inflation, so that the very high ratio early in the
mortgage is counter-balanced by a lower ratio later on.
The conventional mortgage thus treats the home-
buyer very differently depending on anticipated infla-
tion. In a noninflationary environment, the family in-
come is expected to be relatively stable in dollar
terms, and the mortgage payment plan is in complete
agreement with such an expectation. However, in an
inflationary environment the family expects its income
to rise with inflation; the fixed dollar mortgage pay-
ment fails to take such an expectation into account.
Thus, while nominal interest rates clearly reflect ex-
pectations of future inflation and require compensa-
tion accordingly, the payment schedule for a conven-
tional mortgage does not reflect such expectations.
THE MORTGAGE PAYMENT-INCOME
RATIO: LOAN CRITERION
This example indicates quite pointedly how allow-
ing for a maximum ratio on the mortgage payment to
family income is a dubious rule for the lender to fol-
low in determining whether or not to make a loan
under conventional arrangements. The two families
are in exactly the same situation in real terms. The
current house prices are the same. The expected real
income streams are the same. And the expected real
interest rates are the same. Therefore, if the family
in the noninflationary environment can buy the house,
then the family in the inflationary environment should
also be able to buy the same house.
Solely considering the ratio of the nominal mort-
gage payment to income in the first year of the mort-
gage would suggest that thefamily expecting 8 percent
inflation is less able to afford the house than the
family expecting no inflation. Flowever, this problem
is a function of the interaction of anticipated inflation
and the conventional mortgage; it is unrelated to
whether or not the family can ultimately pay off the
loan. Surely if the family could “afford” the home in
the case of zero inflation, they could “afford” it in
the case of 8 percent inflation. In this light, recent
increases in the acceptable mortgage payment to fam-
ily income ratio are not seen as a major problem for
the long-run solvency of mortgage lenders, and in fact
is a natural response to the interaction of inflation
and the conventional mortgage.
The Real Mortgage Expenses
Table 3 further shows that the family in the infla-
tionary situation pays a substantially larger inflation-
adjusted mortgage payment in the early years of the
mortgage than the family in the non-inflationary case.
In our example, the real payments (in terms of actual
command over goods and services) are higher for the
family in the inflationary environment for the first
11 years and lower thereafter. Thus, the early pay-
ments are high, not only relative to the family in-
come, but in real terms also.
In real terms, the family in the inflationary environ-
ment is saving more in the early part of the mortgage
than the family expecting no inflation. Relative to the
family expecting no inflation, the family anticipating
8 percent inflation is postponing consumption in the
early years of the mortgage so it can make the high
nominal payments. This postponed consumption early
in the life of the mortgage is, of course, offset by
lower real payments later on.
It is important to recognize that this savings de-
cision was dictated by the interaction of inflation and
the conventional mortgage. It may not be a choice that
the family would prefer. For example, our family ex-
pecting 8 percent inflation may not like the idea of
spending 27.6 percent of their 1980 income on mort-
gage payments. But, to the extent that only fixed
nominal payment plans are being offered, their choice
becomes either to accept this savings schedule or to
forego buying the home. In this light, it is entirely
likely that we could see a reduced demand for hous-
ing in periods of high anticipated inflation, as a result
of the pattern of real costs imposed by the conven-
tional mortgage. Families and individuals may forego
buying homes in inflationary periods, not because
housing is no longer a worthwhile long-term invest-
ment, but because of the disproportionate real mort-
gage payments forced on them in early years by the
conventional fixed-payment mortgage.
THE CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE AND
EXPECTED INFLATION
Our examplehas shown that in the face of expected
inflation the conventional mortgage acts to front-
end load the mortgage payments both in real terms
and relative to a family’s current income. Moreover,
as expected inflation accelerates, the front-end load-
ing problem becomes more severe. The larger the
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Table 4
Percent of Principal and Interest to Income Under Different Rates of Inflation
8% Inflation 13% Inflation
Payment as Payment as
Payment a percent Payment a percent
adjusted Median of median adjusted Median of median
Year Payment for inflation Income mncome Payment for inflation income Income
1980 $5 933 $5 933 $ 21 500 276% $6,892 $6,892 $ 21 500 32.1%
1981 5933 5,494 23917 248 6,892 6,099 25,024 275
1982 5,933 5087 26,604 22.3 6892 5397 29,125 23.7
1983 5,933 4710 29,596 200 6892 4,777 33,893 203
1984 5,933 4361 32,921 180 6892 4,227 39454 17.5
1985 5,933 4038 38,622 16.2 6,892 3,741 45921 15.0
1986 5,933 3,739 40,738 14.6 6892 3310 53448 129
1987 5,933 3,462 45,317 13.1 8892 2,930 62,208 11.1
1988 5933 3,205 50,410 11 & 6,892 2,592 72,403 95
1989 5,933 2,968 56,076 106 8892 2,294 84,269 82
1990 5933 2,748 62,380 95 6,892 2030 98,082 7.0
1991 5933 2,545 69392 8.5 8,892 1,797 114159 60
1992 5933 2,356 77,192 7.7 8,892 1 590 131,570 52
1993 5,933 2,182 85 867 69 6,892 1,407 154,645 4.5
1994 5,933 2,020 95,518 6.2 6892 1 245 79990 3.8
1995 6,933 1 870 106 255 56 6,892 1 102 209,493 3.3
1996 5,933 1,732 118,198 5.0 6,892 975 243,830 28
1997 5,933 1 604 131,484 4.5 8892 863 283 793 2.4
1998 5,933 1,485 142,262 4,1 6,892 764 330,306 2.1
1999 5,933 1375 162 702 3.7 6,892 676 384443 1.8
2000 5,933 1,273 180 990 3.3 6892 598 447 453 1 5
2001 5,938 1,179 201,333 3-0 6892 529 5 0,791 1 3
2002 5933 1 091 223 969 2.7 6892 468 606,151 11
2003 5933 1,010 249132 2.4 6892 415 705.484 1,0
2004 5,933 936 277 135 2.1 6,892 367 821,115 0,8
2005 5,933 866 308,289 1 9 6,892 325 955 693 07
2006 5,933 802 342,939 1.7 6892 287 1,112344 0.6
2007 5,933 743 381,486 1.6 6892 254 1,294,657 0.5
2008 5,933 688 424,359 1 4 6,892 225 1,506,831 0.5
2009 5,933 637 472 060 1 3 6,892 199 1 753,812 0.4
expected rate of inflation, the higher the nominal Ths feature explains in large part sshy we had no
mortgage rate and the higher the first-year conven ‘affordability” problem from 1978 through 1978.’~
tional mortgage payment — both in real terms and
relative to family income. Table 4 shows this for a - -
IiThere is cursory es idence that tI c front end loading probk i
case in which inflation accele ates from 8 percent to w’ts sidint in 19/ - TI at year s w a sharp ~eeekrition in
13 percent.’3 both infl’,t’os ~nd nominal intere t r tes. Tb ‘ FIT mort ii,c
rat a crag 3 9.55 pcrc nt tint eqr. As uch en, dit on
- were condueiv for th impo ition of significant re I mort
idAt 13 percent i flatioa th family’ ortg, ge plvmert in gag p iilents earl ii the loan. Along these line it
1980 i 32.1 percent of thei 1980 income. If inflation was ‘ippropn’ t’ to m te th~ t 197 w~s one of only two - ear
exp eted to be 40 percent or lore the familys mortgage Lois 196o to 1980 in whiel hon tug price did not rise a
payment would have exceeded their hicoin , apidly as con umption goods.
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Over this period, both inflation and nominal interest
rates were fairly low — suggesting relatively low ex-
pected inflation. For example, the FHA mortgage rate
was below 10 percent from 1976 through 1978. Be-
ginning in 1979, however, inflation and nominal inter-
est rates rose sharply. Since the early part of 1979,
the front-end loading problem has likely become an
important one for homebuyers, especially first-time
buyers.~For previous homeowners, this problem is
not as severe since the)’ have realized significant capi-
tal gains from homeownership which can offset the
front-end loading problem.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A family with the 1980 median income must pay
over 33 percent of their income to buy the 1980
median-priced house. In comparison, the 1965 median-
income family paid less than 15 percent of their in-
come to buy the 1965 median-priced house. To some
‘1There is an alternative mortgage arrangement that can be
implemented to avoid this problem. For a discussion of such
a mortgage, see Donald Lessard and Franco Modigliani, “In-
flation and the Housing Market: Problems and Potential
Solutions,” in Donald Lessard and Franco Modigliani, eds.,
New Mortgage Designs for Stable Housing in an Iaflolionary
Encironment (Proceedings of a Conference Sponsored by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston), pp. 13-45; and Henry J.
Cassidy, “Price-Level Adjusted Mortgages (PLAMs): A
Comparison with other Home Mortgage Instruments” (Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board, Working Paper No. 90, Janu-
ary 1981),
Note, however, that the variable or renegotiable mortgnge
rate arrangements will not resolve the current cash-fiosv prob-
len’s for first-time buyers.
extent, this drastic change is due to the fact that
housing prices have risen faster than inflation, spurred
on by demographic factors and the preferential tax
treatment of housing which has accelerated with infla-
tion. Family incomes, however, have to a large extent
kept up with housing prices, so this phenomenon is
not as crucial as may first appear.
The main culprit in causing the significant increase
in the proportion of income a new buyer must pay
to purchase a house is the combination of the expec-
tation of higher future inflation and the conventional
mortgage. Expected inflation requires that lenders be
compensated for the expected deterioration in the
purchasing power of money. Moreover, the conven-
tional mortgage requires that payments, including
those due to future inflationary effects on the value
of money, be spread evenly’ over the duration of the
mortgage so that dollar payments are constant. As
such, today’s conventional mortgage imposes a signifi-
cant cash-flow problem for the homebuyer, especially
the first-time buyer.
It is thus likely that many prospective new home-
buyers recently have postponed home purchases or
have bought a lower-priced home than they originally
desired, either because of the significant real costs of
the mortgage in the early years, or because of the
limitation on mortgage debt to income imposed by
credit institutions. In this regard, an)’ actions taken
to reduce inflation will benefit the long-term future
of the housing industry.
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